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We provide a tool for estimating DSGE models by Bayesian Maximum-likelihood methods
under very general information assumptions. This framework is applied to a New Keynesian
model where we compare the standard approach, that assumes an informational asymmetry
between private agents and the econometrician, with an assumption of informational
symmetry. For the former, private agents observe all state variables including shocks,
whereas the econometrician uses only data for output, inflation and interest rates. For the
latter both agents have the same imperfect information set and this corresponds to what we
term the ‘informational consistency principle’. We first assume rational expectations and then
generalize the model to allow some households and firms to form expectations adaptively.
We find that in terms of model posterior probabilities, impulse responses, second moments
and autocorrelations, the assumption of informational symmetry by rational agents
significantly improves the model fit. We also find qualified empirical support for the
heterogenous expectations model.
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D Figures 381 Introduction
A large recent literature has relaxed the extreme information assumptions of standard ra-
tional expectations in what are now referred to as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models. There are many approaches on oﬀer ranging from those that stay within
the conventional rational expectations paradigm to behavioural alternatives. In the former
category are a number of reﬁnements that assume that agents are not able to perfectly
observe states that deﬁne the economy. Thus Pearlman et al. (1986) propose a general
framework for introducing information limitations at the point agents form expectations.
Pearlman (1992), Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Svensson and Woodford (2001) use
this framework to study optimal monetary policy. Collard and Dellas (2004), Collard and
Dellas (2006) (discussed below) investigate empirical issues associated with imperfect infor-
mation. The ‘Rational Inattention’ literature that includes Mankiw and Reis (2002), Sims
(2005), Adam (2007), Luo and Young (2009), Luo (2006)) and Reis (2009) ﬁts into this
agenda, the basic idea being that agents can process information subject to a constraint
placing an upper bound on the information ﬂow. The literature cited up to now all assumes
homogeneous agents with a common information set, or a simple form of aggregation across
staggered information up-dating; the examination of diverse agents with diverse information
sets goes back to Townsend (1983) and has been recently developed by Woodford (2003)
and Pearlman and Sargent (2003).
A relaxation of the rational expectations assumption itself is provided by the statistical
rational learning literature pioneered by Evans and Honkapohja (2000) and adopted in a
estimated macro-model by Milani (2007). This introduces a speciﬁc form of bounded ratio-
nality in which utility-maximizing agents make forecasts in each period based on standard
econometric techniques such as least squares. In many cases this converges to a rational
expectations equilibrium. A more drastic ‘behavioural’ alternative that limits the cognitive
ability of agents still further is proposed by the ‘animal spirits’ approach of DeGrauwe
(2009) where agents choose between, and learn about alternative simple forecasting rules.
At the same time the formal estimation of DSGE models by Bayesian methods has
become standard.1 However, as Levine et al. (2007) ﬁrst pointed out, most of this DSGE
estimation makes asymmetric information assumptions where perfect information about
current shocks and other macroeconomic variables is available to the economic agents, but
not to the econometricians. Although perfect information on idiosyncratic shocks may be
available to economic agents, it is implausible to assume that they have full information
on economy-wide shocks. It therefore makes sense to address empirically alternative in-
formation assumptions to assess whether parameter estimates are consistent across these
assumptions and whether these alternatives lead to a better model ﬁt.
In this paper we present two models: The ﬁrst stays within the conventional rational
expectations framework, but relaxes the extreme perfect information assumptions for the
1See Fernandez-Villaverde (2009) for a comprehensive and accessible review.
1private sector. In a basic New Keynesian (NK) macro-model we make the assumption
that either agents are better informed than the econometricians (the standard asymmetric
information case in the estimation literature) or that they both have only the same imperfect
information available, and that there is informational symmetry. We utilize the solution
in the latter case, obtained for a completely general linear rational expectations model
by Pearlman et al. (1986). The second model introduces heterogeneous expectations and
encompasses the ﬁrst. Proportions of households and ﬁrms form either rational or adaptive
expectations. This captures the spirit of the simple learning rules in DeGrauwe (2009) and
of the statistical learning literature whilst enabling the model to be expressed in a linear
form. This, in turn, is essential for the Kalman-ﬁlter techniques we employ to solve the
model under imperfect information. We elaborate on this point in section 4.
The symmetric information assumption is the informational counterpart to the “cog-
nitive consistency principle” proposed in Evans and Honkapohja (2009) which holds that
economic agents should be assumed to be “about as smart as, but no smarter than good
economists”. Whilst we make greater cognitive demands on rational agents, the formation
of rational (model-consistent) expectations, our assumption that agents have no more in-
formation than the economist who constructs and estimates the model amounts to what
we term the informational consistency principle (ICP).2 Certainly the ICP seems plausible
– a central question is whether it adds realism to our model in practice by improving its
empirical performance.
The possibility that imperfect information in NK models improves the empirical ﬁt has
been examined by Collard and Dellas (2004) and Collard and Dellas (2006), although an
earlier assessment of the eﬀects of imperfect information for an IS-LM model dates back to
Minford and Peel (1983). They show that with imperfect information about output and the
technology shock, or with misperceived money, the eﬀect on inﬂation and output of a mon-
etary shock is the hump-shaped one displayed empirically in VAR estimation. With perfect
information, the hump-shaped eﬀect is not in evidence in simulations of the NK model. Col-
lard and Dellas (2006) in particular are able to reproduce this without resorting to lagged
price indexation. The purpose of our paper is to investigate this issue formally within
the Bayesian-maximum likelihood estimation framework examining model ﬁt in terms of
model posterior probabilities, impulse responses, second moments, autocorrelations and a
comparison with a DSGE-VAR.3
2We are grateful to George Evans for pointing this out this analogy to us.
3Since writing an earlier version of this paper, we came across Collard et al. (2009) which carries out
an exercise using the solution method of Pearlman et al. (1986) and Levine et al. (2007) that is similar to
the analysis of our rational expectations model in some respects. We examine a more general behavioural
model that encompasses that with rational expectations. A further distinguishing feature of our work is
that our model validation alongside the marginal likelihood comparison is more comprehensive. But most
importantly, whereas Collard et al. (2009) conclude that marginal likelihood diﬀerences between symmetric
and asymmetric information assumptions are “rather small”, we ﬁnd very signiﬁcant diﬀerences that are
supported by our comparisons of second moments with those of the data and model impulse responses
with that of a DSGE-VAR. This suggests that the importance of imperfect information for understanding
business cycles may be underestimated by these authors.
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the rational expectations
model. Section 3 generalizes the model to a behavioural one where certain proportions of
households and ﬁrms form rational and adaptive expectations. Section 4 sets out the
solution method (summarizing Pearlman et al. (1986)) and pays particular attention to
a technical but important issue of log-linearization. We also show that our framework
encompasses the rational inattention approach of Sims (2005), Adam (2007) and Luo and
Young (2009) as a special case. Sections 5 provides an analytical solution for a simpliﬁed
version of our model that demonstrates how imperfect information gives rise to endogenous
persistence in the sense that it is not solely driven by exogenous shocks. Sections 6 and 7
set out and discuss the results of our Bayesian estimation. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Rational Expectations Model
We utilize a fairly standard NK model with a Taylor-type interest rate rule. The simplicity
of our model facilitates the separate examination of diﬀerent sources of persistence in the
model. First, the model in its most general form has external habit in consumption habit
and price indexing. These are part of the model, albeit ad hoc in the case of indexing,
and therefore endogenous. Persistent exogenous shocks to demand, technology and the
price mark-up classify as exogenous persistence. A key feature of the model is a further
endogenous source of persistence that arises when agents have imperfect information and
learn about the state of the economy using Kalman-ﬁlter updating.
The full model in non-linear form is as follows















































1 = ξ˜ Π
ζ−1












3Yt = Ct + Gt (10)
Equation (1) is the familiar Euler equation with β the discount factor, 1 + Rt the gross
nominal interest rate, MUC
t the marginal utility of consumption and Π ≡ Pt
Pt−1 the gross
inﬂation rate, with Pt the price level. The operator Et[·] denotes rational expectations
conditional upon a general information set (see section 4). In (2) the real wage, Wt
Pt is a
mark-up on the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. MUL
t is
the marginal utility of labour supply Lt. Equation (3) deﬁnes the marginal cost. Equations
(4) to (9) describe Calvo pricing with 1 − ξ equal to the probability of a monopolistically
competitive ﬁrm re-optimizing its price, indexing by an amount γ with an exogenous mark-
up shock MSt. They are derived from the optimal price-setting ﬁrst-order condition for a
ﬁrm j setting a new optimized price P0





















where the stochastic discount factor Dt,t+k = βk MUC
t+k/Pt+k
MUC
t /Pt , and demand for ﬁrm j’s output,















Ht is the real optimized price in (7) and (8).
Equation (6) is the production function with labour the only variable input into pro-
duction and the technology shock At exogenous. Price dispersion ∆t, deﬁned by (7), can
be shown for large n, the number of ﬁrms, to be given by
∆t = ξ˜ Π
ζ






Finally (10), where Ct denotes consumption, describes output equilibrium, with an exoge-
nous government spending demand shock Gt. To close the model we assume a current
inﬂation based Taylor-type interest-rule













where ǫe,t is a monetary policy shock.4
The following form of the single period utility for household r is a non-separable function
4Note the Taylor rule feeds back on output relative to its steady state rather than the output gap so we
avoid making excessive informational demands on the central bank when implementing this rule.
4of consumption and labour eﬀort that is consistent with a balanced growth steady state:
Ut =
 
(Ct(r) − hCCt−1)1−̺(1 − Lt(r))̺ 1−σ
1 − σ
(15)
where hCCt−1 is external habit. In equilibrium Ct(r) = Ct and diﬀerentiating we have
MUC
t = (1 − ̺)(Ct − hCCt−1)(1−̺)(1−σ)−1(1 − Lt)̺(1−σ) (16)
MUL
t = −(Ct − hCCt−1)(1−̺)(1−σ)̺(1 − Lt)̺(1−σ)−1 (17)















where A, G denote the non-stochastic balanced growth values or paths of the variables




ǫe,t is assumed to be white noise. Following Smets and Wouters (2007) and others in the
literature, we decompose the price mark-up shock into persistent and transient component:












This results in MSt being an ARMA(1,1) process. We can normalize A = 1 and put
MS = MSper = MStra = 1 in the steady state. ǫmstra,t, is also assumed to be i.i.d. with
mean zero and variance σ2
ǫmstra. The innovations are assumed to have zero contemporaneous
correlation. This completes the model. The equilibrium is described by 14 equations, (1)–
(10) and (14)–(17) deﬁning 13 endogenous variables Πt ˜ Πt Ct Yt ∆t Rt MCt MUC
t Ut MUL
t
Lt Ht Jt and Wt
Pt . There are 4 shocks in the system: At, Gt, MSt and ǫe,t.
The log-linearization5 of the model about the non-stochastic steady state is given by














(1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)
(1 + βγ)ξ
(mct + mst) (24)
5Lower case variables are deﬁned as xt = log
Xt
X . rt and πt are log-deviations of gross rates. The validity
of this log-linear procedure for general information sets is discussed in the next section.
5where marginal utility, muC
t , and marginal costs, mct, are deﬁned by
muC
t =
(1 − ̺)(1 − σ) − 1
1 − hC




mct = wt − pt − at + (1 − α)lt
wt − pt = muL
t − muC
t










Equations (22) and (23) constitute the micro-founded ‘IS Curve’ and demand side for the
model, given the monetary instrument. According to (23) solved forward in time, the
marginal utility of consumption is the sum of all future expected real interest rates. (24)
is the ‘NK Philips Curve‘, the supply side of our model. In the absence of indexing it says
that the inﬂation rate is the discounted sum of all future expected marginal costs. Note
that price dispersion, ∆t, disappears up to a ﬁrst order approximation and therefore does
not enter the linear dynamics. Finally, shock processes and the Taylor rule are given by
gt+1 = ρggt + ǫg,t+1
at+1 = ρaat + ǫa,t+1
mspert+1 = ρmsmspert + ǫmsper,t+1
mst = mspert + ǫmstra,t
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1 − ρr)[θππt + θyyt] + ǫe,t
Bayesian estimation is based on the rational expectations solution of the log-linear
model. The conventional approach assumes that the private sector has perfect information
of the entire state vector muC
t , πt, πt−1, ct−1, c∗
t−1 and, crucially, current shocks mspert,
mst, at. These are extreme information assumptions and exceed the data observations
on three data sets yt, πt and rt that we subsequently use to estimate the model. If the
private sector can only observe these data series (we refer to this as symmetric information)
we must turn from a solution under perfect information on the part of the private sector
(later referred to as asymmetric information – AI since the private sector’s information set
exceeds that of the econometrician) to one under imperfect information – II.
3 The Behavioural Model
We now assume that proportions λh and λf of households and ﬁrms respectively form
rational expectations as before, but now the remaining agents form adaptive expectations.
Our assumption of adaptive expectations diﬀers from statistical learning as in Milani (2007),
and from limiting the private sector to simple rules (“heuristics”), but allowing a degree of
rationality through a selection process that evaluates their performance, as in DeGrauwe
6(2009). These alternatives would be of interest in our imperfect information environment,
but as yet our techniques cannot be applied to these cases (see section 4 for more discussion).
Consider ﬁrst households. In principle those forming rational expectations could make
diﬀerent consumption and labour supply decisions. However we can avoid this complication
by making the standard assumption of perfect insurance to equalize consumption decisions
across the two types. Since they face the same real wage it follows from equating the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure that labour supply decisions
are the same too. What now changes for households is that expectations are composites of
rational (Er
t [·]) and adaptive (Ea
t [·]) with weights λh and 1 − λh respectively. First order
conditions for the representative household are now given by






























Turning to ﬁrms, the optimal price-setting equation for any ﬁrm setting new prices is
given as before by (11). However this choice is diﬀerent for ﬁrms forming adaptive and
rational expectations.6 It is convenient to adopt the setup of in which we have perfectly
competitive wholesale ﬁrms who produce a homogeneous good, which is bought by retail
ﬁrms who diﬀerentiate the product at a ﬁxed cost; then the real marginal cost of the




will be passed on to the retail ﬁrms, so that this
is the same for all retail ﬁrms, be they rational or adaptive. Thus in (11) the only thing
that diﬀers for rational or adaptive ﬁrms is the way they form expectations. It follows
that the RHS of the equations in J,H below are dependent on the economy-wide values of
Y,MUC,MC. Assume that the proportion of rational ﬁrms in the economy is λf. Then
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Yt = Ct + Gt
Now we have a separate set of inﬂation dynamic for rational and adaptive ﬁrms with
aggregate indexation-modiﬁed inﬂation ˜ Πt given by a weighted sum of optimized real prices.
Similarly price dispersion, ∆t, is now a weighted sum of contributions from the two types
of ﬁrms.











t ˜ Πt. We further distinguish between adaptive expectations of inﬂation by
households and ﬁrms, Ea
h,t[πt+1] and Ea
f,t[πt+1] respectively. We can eliminate the latter
and after some manipulation (see Appendix A) show that the log-linearization is as follows:
yt = cyct + (1 − cy)gt (27)
λhEr
t muC














πt − γπt−1 = (1 − ξ)(λf ¯ qr






t+2 = (1 − ξβ 1)Er
t ¯ qa




t , mct, shock processes and the Taylor rule are exactly as for the rational expec-
tations model.7 Adaptive expectations are given by
Ea
f,t¯ qa
t+1 =  1¯ qa





c,t+1 =  2muC





t+1 =  3πt + (1 −  3)Ea
h,t−1πa
t
Equations (27) and (28) constitute the ‘IS’ curve with composite expectations by the house-
holds. Equations (29) – (31) deﬁne the two NK Phillips Curves for rational and adaptive
ﬁrms. (30) now gives aggregate inﬂation and (31) is the deﬁning equation for Er
t ¯ qa
t+1. Note
that when all agents are rational, i.e., λh = λf = 1, then πt −γπt−1 = (1−ξ)¯ qr
t and we get
back to the previous NK model.
7Note that for estimation purposes the coeﬃcient on mst in (24) and (29) has been normalised to 1.
84 General Solution with Imperfect Information
Both RE and behavioural models are a special case of the following general setup in non-
linear form
Zt+1 = J(Zt,EtZt,Xt,EtXt) + νσǫt+1 (32)
EtXt+1 = K(Zt,EtZt,Xt,EtXt) (33)
where Zt,Xt are (n−m)×1 and m×1 vectors of backward and forward-looking variables,
respectively, and ǫt is a ℓ × 1 shock variable, ν is an (n − m) × ℓ matrix and σ is a small
scalar. In log-linearized form with zt ≡ log Zt
Z where Z is the possibly trended steady state
and xt ≡ log Xt
























where zt,xt are vectors of backward and forward-looking variables, respectively, and ut
is a shock variable; a more general setup allows for shocks to the equations involving
expectations. In addition we assume that agents all make the same observations at time t,
which are given by














in non-linear and linear forms respectively, where  σǫt and vt represents measurement
errors. Given the fact that expectations of forward-looking variables depend on the infor-
mation set, it is hardly surprising that the absence of full information will impact on the
path of the system.
In order to simplify the exposition we assume terms in EtZt and EtXt do not appear
in the set-up so that in the linearized form B = L = 0. Full details of the solution for the
general setup are provided in Pearlman et al. (1986).8
4.1 Linear Approximation about the Non-Stochastic Steady State
Before proceeding to the rational expectations solution, we need to pose a basic question: is
(34) linearized about the deterministic steady state, where expectations are conditional on
any information set, a correct general form of the ﬁrst-order approximation to the non-linear
model above? In other words, up to a ﬁrst order approximation, are the expected values of
all variables in the non-linear model equal to their deterministic steady state values?
8Our model reduces to this form if we assume a pure inﬂation targeting rule with θy = 0 in (14). In fact
we ﬁnd our empirical results to change very little with this simpliﬁcation.
9We draw upon and generalize the results of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) on approx-
imating non-linear RE models, Pearlman et al. (1986) PI solutions of linear RE models, and
extended Kalman ﬁlter approximations for non-linear models. The latter is diﬀerent from
the standard engineering literature in which the Kalman ﬁlter is re-linearized at every stage
(see Appendix B). However if the system is always close to the equilibrium, then there is
no advantage to be gained from this, and we keep the linearization about the equilibrium.
It is important to emphasize that there are no theorems to show that the extended Kalman
ﬁlter guarantees convergence to the true nonlinear ﬁlter even for ﬁrst-order deviations from
the steady state. However it is a technique that is widely used, and the empirical evidence
in its favour is good. The proofs in the appendix are therefore subject to the assumption
that the approximation to the nonlinear ﬁlter is good to ﬁrst order.
We now prove the following which establishes our requirement for the ﬁrst order ap-
proximation:
Theorem
We look for a RE solution to to the non-linear model (32) and (33) under imperfect infor-
mation which involves the innovations process variable ˜ Zt ≡ Zt − Et−1Zt:
Xt = g(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ); Zt+1 = h(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ) + ησεt+1 ; ˜ Zt+1 = f( ˜ Zt,σ) + ησεt+1
where σ is small. Then we have that gσ = hσ = 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
This is the most important part of the generalization of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004),
and the remainder represents a linearized version of Pearlman et al. (1986).
4.2 Solution Procedure
First assume perfect information. Following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), it is well-known
that, there is then a saddle path satisfying:












where ΛU has unstable eigenvalues.
In the imperfect information case, following Pearlman et al. (1986), we use the Kalman

















where we denote zt,t ≡ Et[zt] etc. Thus the best estimator of the state vector at time t− 1













where D ≡ M1 − M2A−1






EPDT +V where E ≡ M1−M2N, V = cov(vt) is the covariance matrix of the measurement
errors and P satisﬁes the Ricatti equation (40) below.
Using the Kalman ﬁlter, the solution as derived by Pearlman et al. (1986)9 is given by
the following processes describing the pre-determined and non-predetermined variables zt
and xt and a process describing the innovations ˜ zt ≡ zt − zt,t−1:
Predetermined : zt+1 = Czt + (A − C)˜ zt + (C − A)PDT(DPDT + V )−1(D˜ zt + vt)
+ ut+1 (37)
Non-predetermined : xt = −Nzt + (N − A−1
22 A21)˜ zt (38)
Innovations : ˜ zt+1 = A˜ zt − APDT(DPDT + V )−1(D˜ zt + vt) + ut+1 (39)
where C ≡ A11 − A12N, A ≡ A11 − A12A−1
22 A21, D ≡ L1 − L2A−1
22 A21
and P is the solution of the Riccati equation given by
P = APAT − APDT(DPDT + V )−1DPAT + U (40)
where U = cov(ut) is the covariance matrix of the shocks to the system.
We can see that the solution procedure above is a generalization of the Blanchard-Kahn
solution for perfect information by putting ˜ zt = vt = 0 to obtain
zt+1 = Czt + ut+1 ; xt = −Nzt (41)
By comparing (41) with (37) we see that the determinacy of the system is independent
of the information set. This is an important property that contrasts with the case where
private agents use statistical learning to form forward expectations.
4.3 Statistical Learning
We now pose the question as to whether our framework can handle statistical learning.
The work of Milani (2007) assumes that non-rational agents form expectations on the
basis of having estimated the relationship between forward and backward-looking variables
(including shocks) using discounted least squares. However he does this in the context
of a very simple model in which there is only one representative agent, with all variables
9A less general solution procedure for linear models with imperfect information is provided by Lungu
et al. (2008) with an application to a small open economy model, which they also extend to a non-linear
version.
11observable, and as a consequence all shocks are observable with a lag of one period; hence
one can apply e-stability results to show that there is convergence of the system to an
equilibrium, which coincides with the rational expectations equilibrium. Our model is more
complex, requiring inferences to be made about the shocks, so that the ﬁltered values are
obtained rather than the true values. In general Bullard and Eusepi (2009), among others,
show that there can be convergence to a system that exhibits indeterminacy. Any theory
to account for this in estimation under imperfect information is currently non-existent, so
we have taken a line of least resistance and assume non-rational agents form expectations
adaptively.
4.4 Rational Inattention
On the theme of rational inattention, the fact that the dynamics of zt depend on the
dynamics of ˜ zt is equivalent to the result of Luo and Young (2009). For a simple stochastic
growth model with rational inattention, they show that the dynamics of capital in their
model, kt, depends on ˆ kt where the latter is last period’s expected value of kt, which in
our notation would be kt − ˜ kt. it is also interesting to note that when there is only one
predetermined variable in the system (as in Adam (2007) and Luo and Young (2009)), and
it is observed with measurement error, then there is a one-to-one relationship between the
variance of this error and the information channel capacity, the latter measuring the inverse
of the degree of rational inattention. This is because if kt has a normal distribution, then the
diﬀerence in entropy at time t before and after a noisy measurement of kt is a function10 of
σ2
k/(pk +σ2
k), where pk = vart−1kt and σ2
k is the variance of the noise. Thus if σ2
k is deﬁned,
then after solving the Riccati equation above, one can evaluate the capacity of the channel.
Conversely, when the capacity is given, one can evaluate pk/σ2
k, followed by pk from the
Riccati equation, which then implies σ2
k. When there are several predetermined variables,
with noisy observations made on only one, then there is still a one-to-one relationship; thus
if kt = hTzt, then the diﬀerence in entropy is σ2
k/(hTPh + σ2
k) where P = vart−1zt.
Thus our general framework with measurement error encompasses the rational inat-
tention literature that assumes a single predetermined variable and relies on information
channel capacity. However when more than one variable is observed with error, then the
variance of the shock to measurements is a square matrix whose number of elements are
obviously larger than the single parameter that represents the channel capacity. Thus we
may consider estimating the capacity when there is one variable that is measured, but this
does not easily generalise to the case when when there is more than one measurement per
time period.
























To demonstrate the imperfect information solution procedure and the possible implica-
tions for endogenous persistence we consider a special case of our model without habit or
indexation:
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1 − βξ)(1 − ξ)
ξ
mct + mst
which for convenience we write as Etπt+1 = 1




w) is now our transient shock to the mark-up. We now assume that xt follows
an exogenous AR(1) process
xt+1 = ρxt + εt+1 ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2
ǫ)





































where α ≡ 1
β.
Under perfect information agents (somehow) observe the entire state vector consisting
of the mark-up shock, the marginal cost and inﬂation. [wt xt πt]
′
. We compare this with
imperfect information where agents observe only inﬂation πt with no measurement error.
Then from our general solution procedure in section 4, the following matrices are deﬁned
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, it follows that the solution is given by


























Figure 1 in Appendix E illustrates the solution for β = 0.99, ρ = 0.9, σǫ = 1 and
σ2
w = 0, 1, 2. The ﬁgure shows an impulse response to the mark-up, x0 = 1. Under
perfect information σ2
w = 0 and inﬂation is given by π = − 1
α−ρxt with xt = ρxt−1, x0 = 1.
Inﬂation jumps immediately to −9.1 but then proceeds to return to zero driven by the
exogenous process for xt. With imperfect information (II) the last term in (42) associated
with the innovation introduces endogenous persistence arising from the rational learning
of the private sector about this unobserved shock using Kalman updating. The inﬂation
trajectory is now hump-shaped and the deviation from the v-shaped perfect information
path increases as the variance of the transient shock σ2
w increases.
6 Bayesian Estimation
In the same year that Blanchard and Kahn (1980) provide a general solution for a linear
model under RE in the state space form, Sims (1980) suggests the use of Bayesian methods
for solving multivariate systems. This leads to the development of Bayesian VAR (BVAR)
models (Doan et al. (1984)), and, during the 1980s, the extensive development and appli-
cation of Kalman ﬁltering-based state space systems methods in statistics and economics
(Aoki (1987), Harvey (1989)).
Modern DSGE methods further enhance this Kalman ﬁltering based Bayesian VAR state
space model with Monte-Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) optimising, stochastic simulation
and importance-sampling (Metropolis-Hastings (MH) or Gibbs) algorithms. The aim of this
enhancement is to provide the optimised estimates of the expected values of the currently
unobserved, or the expected future values of the variables and of the relational parameters
together with their posterior probability density distributions (Geweke (1999)). It has been
shown that DSGE estimates are generally superior, especially for the longer-term predictive
estimation than the VAR (but not BVAR) estimates (Smets and Wouters (2007)), and
particularly in data-rich conditions (Boivin and Giannoni (2005)).
The crucial aspect is that agents in DSGE models are forward-looking. As a con-
sequence, any expectations that are formed are dependent on the agents’ information set.
Thus unlike a backward-looking engineering system, the information set available will aﬀect
the path of a DSGE system.
The Bayesian approach uses the Kalman ﬁlter to combine the prior distributions for
the individual parameters with the likelihood function to form the posterior density. This
posterior density can then be obtained by optimizing with respect to the model parameters
through the use of the Monte-Carlo Markov Chain sampling methods. Four variants of
our linearized model are estimated using the Dynare software (Juillard (2003)), which has
been extended by the paper’s authors to allow for imperfect information on the part of the
private sector.
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Chris Sim’s csminwel after the models’ log-prior densities and log-likelihood functions are
obtained by running the Kalman recursion and are evaluated and maximized. Then a
sample from the posterior distribution is obtained with the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm
using the inverse Hessian at the estimated posterior mode as the covariance matrix of the
jumping distribution. The scale used for the jumping distribution in the MH is set in order
to allow a good acceptance rate (20%-40%). A number of parallel Markov chains of 100000
runs each are run for the MH in order to ensure the chains converge. The ﬁrst 25% of
iterations (initial burn-in period) are discarded in order to remove any dependence of the
chain from its starting values.
6.1 Data, Priors and Model Identifiability
To estimate the system, we use three macro-economic observables at quarterly frequency
for the US: real GDP, the GDP deﬂator and the nominal interest rate. Since the variables
in the model are measured as deviations from a constant steady state, the time series are
simply de-trended against a linear trend in order to obtain approximately stationary data.
Following Smets and Wouters (2003), all variables are treated as deviations around the
sample mean. Real variables are measured in logarithmic deviations from linear trends,
in percentage points, while inﬂation (the GDP deﬂator) and the nominal interest rate are
detrended by the same linear trend in inﬂation and converted to quarterly rates. The
estimation results are based on a sample from 1970:1 to 2004:4.
The values of priors are taken from Levin et al. (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
Table 6 in Appendix D provides an overview of the priors used for each model variant
described below. In general, inverse gamma distributions are used as priors when non-
negativity constraints are necessary, and beta distributions for fractions or probabilities.
Normal distributions are used when more informative priors seem to be necessary. We use
the same prior means as in previous studies and allow for larger standard deviations, i.e.
less informative priors, in particular for the habit parameter and price indexation. The
priors on α, ξ are the exceptions and based on Smets and Wouters (2007) with smaller
standard deviations. Also, for the parameters γ, hC, ξ and ̺ we centre the prior density in
the middle of the unit interval. The priors related to the process for the price mark-up shock
are taken from Smets and Wouters (2007). The priors for  1, 2, 3,λh,λf are also assumed
beta distributed with means 0.5 and standard deviations 0.2. Three of the structural
parameters are kept ﬁxed in the estimation procedure. These calibrated parameters are
β = 0.99; L = 0.4, cy = 0.6.
As emphasized by Canova and Sala (2009), it is necessary to confront the question
of parameter identiﬁability in any DSGE model before taking the model to the data.
Model/parameters identiﬁcation is a prerequisite for the informativeness of diﬀerent es-
timators, and their eﬀectiveness when one uses the models to address policy questions and
sources of identiﬁcation failure could be marginalization (from the model structure), or lack
15of information (from the data).
Before estimating our models, we carry out a simple experiment examining parameter
identiﬁability in our most general composite-expectations model. In this experiment, using
the log-linearized solutions as the data generating process, we generate artiﬁcial data sets
of length T = 5000 for all the observable variables from the DSGE model. To limit the
inﬂuence of the initial conditions, we discard the ﬁrst 100 observations. In particular, we
simulate the data by imposing the prior means to the parameters. We then re-estimate
the model on the artiﬁcial data sets using the standard Maximum Likelihood (ML) method
and ask whether the ML estimates recover the DSGE model’s priors. Convergence of the
ML procedure then implies that the likelihood surface is not ﬂat, suggesting there may be
no identiﬁability problem.
One advantage of this technique is that it is completely independent of the nature or
the size of the data used in estimation so that we can detect potential identiﬁcation failures
which are inherent in the model structure. The simulation and estimation results are then
compared with the prior distributions and reported in Table 6. In the table, we measure the
bias as the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the prior mean and the ML estimate for
each parameter. We see that the bias is not markedly greater than one standard deviation
in all cases, and much smaller in many cases indicating a 90% conﬁdence interval for the
true model. Overall the identiﬁcation check suggests that identiﬁability in our DSGE model
is generally very strong for much of the parameter space.
6.2 The Rational Expectations Model
We consider 4 model variants: GH (γ,hC > 0), G (hC = 0), H (γ = 0) and Z (zero persis-
tence or γ = hC = 0). Then for each model variant we examine three information sets: ﬁrst
we make the assumption that private agents are better informed than the econometricians
(the standard asymmetric information case in the estimation literature) – the Asymmetric
Information (AI) case. Then we examine two symmetric information sets for both econo-
metrician and private agents: Imperfect Information without measurement error on the
three observables rt,πt,yt (II) and measurement error on two observables πt,yt (IIME).
This gives 12 sets of results. First Table 7 in Appendix D reports the parameter estimates
using Bayesian methods. It summarizes posterior means of the studied parameters and
90% conﬁdence intervals for the four model speciﬁcations across the three information sets,
AI, II and IIME, as well as the posterior model odds. Overall, the parameter estimates are
plausible and reasonably robust across model and information speciﬁcations. The results
are generally similar to those of Levin et al. (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007) for the
US, thus allowing us to conduct relevant empirical comparisons.
First it is interesting to note that the parameter estimates are fairly consistent across
the information assumptions despite the fact that these alternatives lead to a considerably
better model ﬁt based on the corresponding posterior marginal data densities. On the other
hand, the point estimates are relatively less robust across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations,
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process of mark-up shock.
Focusing on the parameters characterising the degree of price stickiness and the existence
of real rigidities, we ﬁnd that the price indexation parameters are estimated to be smaller
than assumed in the prior distribution (in line with those reported by Smets and Wouters
(2007)). The estimates of γ imply that inﬂation is intrinsically not very persistent in the
relevant model speciﬁcations (the weight on lagged inﬂation in the Phillips curve is 0.27
implied by Model GH when assuming perfect information). If we assume an imperfect
information set on GH, the model estimates that inﬂation is sightly more persistent as the
weight becomes 0.33. The posterior mean estimates for the Calve price-setting parameter,
ξ, obtained from Model GH across all the information sets imply an average price contract
duration of about ﬁve quarters, similar to the ﬁndings of Christiano et al. (2005), Levin
et al. (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The external habit parameter is estimated to
be around 80% of past consumption, which is somewhat higher than the estimates reported
in Christiano et al. (2005), although this turns out to be a very robust outcome of the
estimated models. The point estimates of hC obtained from the imperfect information
version seems to be slightly closer to the plausible values.
In Table 1 we report the posterior marginal data density from the estimation which
is computed using the Geweke (1999) modiﬁed harmonic-mean estimator. The marginal
data density can be interpreted as maximum log-likelihood values, penalized for the model
dimensionality, and adjusted for the eﬀect of the prior distribution (Chang et al. (2002)).
Whichever model variant has the highest marginal data density attains the best relative
model ﬁt.
Model AI II IIME
H -238.20 -230.89 -231.37
G -245.30 -239.15 -238.40
GH -239.59 -230.95 -230.52
Z -244.37 -242.04 -239.21
Table 1: Marginal Log-likelihood Values Across Model Variants and Information Sets
The model posterior probabilities are constructed as follows. Let pi (θ|mi) represent
the prior distribution of the parameter vector θ ∈ Θ for some model mi ∈ M and let
L(y|θ,mi) denote the likelihood function for the observed data y ∈ Y conditional on the
model and the parameter vector. Then the joint posterior distribution of θ for model mi
combines the likelihood function with the prior distribution:
pi (θ|y,mi) ∝ L(y|θ,mi)pi (θ|mi)
Bayesian inference also allows a framework for comparing alternative and potentially
17misspeciﬁed models based on their marginal likelihood. For a given model mi ∈ M and





where pi (θ|mi) is the prior density for model mi, and L(y|mi) is the data density for
model mi given parameter vector θ. To compare models (say, mi and mj) we calculate
the posterior odds ratio which is the ratio of their posterior model probabilities (or Bayes
Factor when the prior odds ratio,
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in terms of the log-likelihoods. Components (43) and (44) provide a framework for com-
paring alternative and potentially misspeciﬁed models based on their marginal likelihood.
Such comparisons are important in the assessment of rival models.
Given Bayes factors we can compute the model probabilities p1,p2,· · ·pn for n models.
Since
 n
i=1 pi = 1 we have that 1
p1 =
 n
i=2 BFi,1, from which p1 is obtained. Then pi =
p1BF(i,1) gives the remaining model probabilities. These are reported in Table 2 where








Remaining prob. are almost zero
Table 2: Model Probabilities Across Model Variants and Information Sets
Tables 1 and 2 reveal that a combination of Model GH and with information set IIME
outperforms its 11 rivals with a posterior probability of 36%. However, the diﬀerences in
log marginal likelihood or the posterior odds ratio are not substantive between Models GH
and H under either IIME or II. For example, the log marginal likelihood diﬀerence between
Model GH under IIME and Model H under II is 0.43. As suggested by Kass and Raftery
(1995), in order to choose the former over later, we need a prior probability over Model GH
under IIME 1.54 (≈ e0.43) times larger than our prior probability over Model H under II.
This factor is believed to be small and therefore we are unable to conclude that Model GH
under IIME outperforms Model H under II. Equivalently, in Bayesian model comparison,
18a posterior Bayes factor needs to be at least 3 for there to be a positive evidence favouring
Model mi over mj.
Our analysis of the model comparison contains several important results. First, price
indexation does not improve the model ﬁt, but the existence of habit is crucial as the results
clearly suggest that incorporating habit persistence in consumption in the US model imparts
greater inertia to the model, and improves the ﬁt (relatively). Second, the II (or IIME)
speciﬁcation leads to signiﬁcantly better ﬁt for all model variants. Third, we ﬁnd substantial
evidence that the combinations of Models GH/H and IIME/II are far superior to any other
combinations in terms of the ability to explain the data highlighting the importance of the
underlying model persistence mechanisms and informational symmetry.
The focus on various alternative speciﬁcations seeks to address some of the concerns with
Bayesian model comparisons pointed out by Sims (2003). By estimating a large number
of model variants, this method intends to complete the space of competing models and to
compute posterior odds that take into consideration other (seemingly irrelevant) aspects
of the speciﬁcation. One obvious limitation of this methodology is that the assessment of
model ﬁt is only relative to its other rivals with diﬀerent restrictions. The outperforming
model in the space of competing models may still be poor (potentially misspeciﬁed) in
capturing the important dynamics in the data. To further evaluate the absolute performance
of one particular model (or information assumption) against data, it is necessary to compare
the model’s implied characteristics with those of the actual data (or the VAR model).
6.3 The Behavioural Model
We consider the same four model variants and information sets as for the behavioural
model. Table 8 in Appendix D reports the posterior estimates. The estimated policy
coeﬃcients are fairly robust across speciﬁcations and are reasonably consistent with those
using the rational expectations model. The estimates of γ imply that inﬂation is less
persistent compared to the previous model. The results from the behavioural model also
show that the price stickiness parameter is estimated to be larger than assumed in the prior
distribution. This implies that there is a considerable degree of price stickiness. Although
this high degree of nominal stickiness in price is implausible and far from our priors, it
is in line with the ﬁndings by Smets and Wouters (2005) and others.11 Similar to the
rational expectations model, the estimates of risk-aversion parameter are close to the prior
assumption, indicating that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (equal to 1/σ is less
than one which is plausible as suggested in much of RBC literature.
Note that the estimates of the 5 parameters associated with adaptive expectations
across all the speciﬁcations are statistically diﬀerent from zero according to the 90% interval
11It reﬂects the low slope in the Phillips curve in output-inﬂation space as revealed by the data. This
can be reconciled with a plausible degree of price stickiness without signiﬁcantly changing the rest of the
parameter estimates by either introducing Kimball preferences, as in Smets and Wouters (2007), or state-
contingent price contracts, as in Gertler and Leahy (2008). To keep the core model relatively simple, we
have chosen not to go down this route.
19suggesting that they are playing important roles in the US economy. In particular, looking
at Model H under the II assumption, the estimated λh and λf suggest that a share of
around 70% of households form rational expectations while only around 20% ﬁrms are
rational. But the sensitivity of restrictions is strong in these estimates as the estimated
values of  2 and λh are smaller in the absence of habit persistence. Nevertheless, most
of the estimated adaptive expectation parameters are tight estimates based the percentiles
obtained from the estimation suggesting that they are statistically reliable.
Table 3 reports the posterior marginal data density obtained from estimating the be-
havioural model and Table 4 shows the probability ranking. We ﬁnd that Model H with
imperfect information set II has the highest marginal data density and attains the best rela-
tive model ﬁt. This again suggests that incorporating the consumption habit seems to oﬀer
signiﬁcant improvement in terms of the model ﬁt to US data. The degree of consumption
habit is also high and statistically signiﬁcant using the behavioural model suggesting, in
principle, the empirical relevance of the parameter. Also as found in the previous section,
the data shows no support for the price indexation. Finally, in terms of using diﬀerent infor-
mation assumptions, we ﬁnd that the II and IIME speciﬁcations do not lead to signiﬁcantly
better ﬁt for all model variants. As one would expect, the ability of information symmetry
to improve the model ﬁt fall sharply when only 20% of ﬁrms turn out to form adaptive
expectations in our estimation. There is evidence that the combinations of Model H and
all three information assumptions are far superior to any other combinations in terms of
the ability to explain the data, again highlighting the importance of the underlying habit
persistence mechanisms.
Model AI II IIME
H -227.14 -226.55 -227.27
G -242.87 -242.98 -243.15
GH -230.87 -230.79 -230.72
Z -239.27 -238.55 -239.12
Table 3: Marginal Log-likelihood Values Across Model Variants and Information Sets
(The Behavioural Model)
6.4 Impulse Response Analysis
This subsection investigates the importance of shocks to the endogenous variables of in-
terests by analyzing the impulse responses to the structural shocks in the models. As an
alternative way of validating the model performance, we also compare the estimated DSGE
model and an identiﬁed VAR model in terms of matching their impulse responses. To focus
the presentation, this exercise is only performed for Model GH (the ‘best’ rational expecta-
tions model), Model Z (with zero persistence) and Model COM H (the ‘best’ behavioural







Remaining prob. are zero
Table 4: Model Probabilities Across Model Variants and Information Sets (The
Behavioural Model)
changing information assumptions in terms of the impulse response dynamics and to what
extent the simplest NK model Z can be brought closer to the data by introducing imperfect
information.
The estimated model impulse response functions (IRFs) can be directly related from the
state space representation of the above economic model. To tackle the degree of freedom
problem of the VAR models, a solution is to improve these by tilting them towards the
values implied by the DSGE parameters. The latter impose a prior on the VAR, yielding
the so-called DSGE-VAR approach proposed by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004).
In general, their method implements the DSGE model prior by generating dummy
observations from the DSGE model, and adding them to the actual data and leads to an
estimation of the VAR based on a mixed sample of artiﬁcial and actual observations. The
ratio of dummy over actual observations (called the hyperparameter λ) controls the variance
and therefore the weight of the DSGE prior relative to the sample. If λ is small the prior is
diﬀuse. For extreme values of this parameter (0 or ∞) either an unrestricted VAR or the
DSGE model is estimated. The empirical performance of a DSGE-VAR will depend on the
tightness of the DSGE prior. Details on the algorithm used to implement this DSGE-VAR
are to be found in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) and Del Negro et al. (2005).
We ﬁt our VAR to the same data set used to estimate the DSGE model. We con-
sider a VAR with 4 lags.12 We use a data-driven procedure to determine the tightness
of the prior endogenously based on the marginal data density. Our choice of the optimal
λ is 0.5 and this is found by comparing diﬀerent VAR models using the estimates of the
marginal data density. In particular, we iterate over a grid that contains the values of
λ = [0;0.25;0.5;0.75;1;2;5;∞] and we ﬁnd that the DSGE-VAR(4) with λ = 0.5 has the
highest posterior probability.13 This implies that the mixed sample that is used to estimate
the VAR has slightly lower weight on the DSGE model (artiﬁcial observations) than on the
VAR (actual observations).
Figure 2 in Appendix E depicts the mean responses corresponding to a positive one
12The choice of the lag length maximizes the marginal data density associated with the DSGE-VAR(ˆ λ).
13Alternatively, one can simply ﬁnd the ‘optimal’ ˆ λ by estimating the parameter λ as one of the deep
parameters.
21standard deviation shock. The endogenous variables of interest are the observables in the
estimation and each response is for a 10 period (2.5 years) horizon. All DSGE impulse
responses are computed simulating the vector of DSGE model parameters at the posterior
mean values reported in Table 5. The impulse responses for VAR(4) are obtained using the
DSGE-VAR identiﬁcation procedure. Overall, we ﬁnd that the sign and magnitude of the
DSGE and VAR impulse responses are quite similar implying that the DSGE model seems
to mimic the VAR model in, at least, some dimensions. This conﬁrms that the estimated
DSGE model under both AI and II seems to be able to capture the main features of the
US data. The overall impact of the model dynamics can be broadly described using the
estimated impulse responses.
In response to an exogenous policy tightening, our model GH under asymmetric infor-
mation (AI) predicts a decline in output that dies out within a few years, a gradual decrease
in the inﬂation rate over several periods following a hump shaped response and a rise in the
nominal interest rate. These ﬁndings are robust across many empirical studies and can be
viewed as evidence of sizeable and persistent real eﬀects of monetary policy shock captured
by our model GH. When we assume informational symmetry, results for the DSGE model
responses change dramatically. In particular, the imperfect information (II) speciﬁcation
produces a large hump-shaped decline in output (the peak eﬀect occurs roughly over one
year after the shock) and a gradual and lagged response in inﬂation when consumption
habit and indexation are present. The larger decline and sluggish response of output to the
policy shock in the II model show the evidence of endogenous persistence that is driven by
informational symmetry. It is noteworthy that model GH succeeds in accounting for the
inertial responses of inﬂation and output. Model Z without any persistence mechanisms
fails to replicate the observed hump-shaped IRF for inﬂation under both information sets.
It is interesting to note that our behavioural model H under both information sets manages
to simulate a much larger hump-shaped decline in output (the peak eﬀect occurs roughly
over 5 years following the policy change) and does a better job at mimicking the response
generated by the data. This shows further evidence of some endogenous persistence.
Following a positive technological shock, inﬂation and the interest rate fall gradually
as higher productivity shrinks labour demand, pushing marginal cost down on impact,
lowers prices and interest rate and monetary policy does not respond strongly enough to
oﬀset the downward pressure on marginal cost. Again these responses are predicted by
many empirical studies on DSGE models (e.g. Levin et al. (2006) and Smets and Wouters
(2007)) and the estimated reactions from our models account for these behaviours. In
particular, Model GH when assuming II does well at accounting for the dynamic response
of the US output to a productivity shock and Model Z when assuming II does a better job,
compared to its AI counterpart, at predicting the reactions of inﬂation and interest rate
computed from the data following a shock in technology. It is also worth noting that with
AI the DSGE model somewhat overstates the initial responses particularly in inﬂation. In
general, we conclude that the model’s overall performance with respect to a technology
22shock is improved with informational symmetry. In addition, the overall performance of
the behavioural model in matching the dynamic responses in the data is satisfactory, in
particular, outperforming the rational expectation Model GH in predicting the response of
inﬂation after a productivity shock.
With respect to the remaining shocks/responses, our models do well at accounting for
the responses of output and interest rate to a government spending shock and the response
of inﬂation to the transient part of a price mark-up shock. The qualitative eﬀects are similar
and the information speciﬁcation does not seem to make a signiﬁcant impact. The response
of inﬂation following the government spending shock is somewhat overstated by our DSGE
model under either information assumption. In terms of the persistent mark-up shock
(referred to as Mark-up (ms) in Figure 2), the II assumption helps improve the model’s
performance in reﬂecting the central projection, particularly of inﬂation and output. To be
speciﬁc, II helps generate a better shape of IRF while Model GH under AI predicts that
output is not aﬀected very much. Moreover, a result that is worth emphasizing is that
Model Z when assuming II does very well at projecting the most likely after-shock path of
inﬂation. Changing the information assumption slightly improves the IRFs of interest rate.
The simulations from the behavioural Model H using both II and AI show that the
behavioural model does better at projecting the most likely after-shock path of almost all
the variables in response to the government spending and the two versions of mark-up
shocks, getting closer to the data. The only exception is the interest rate response after
a government spending shock. Overall, these results from the estimated posterior impulse
responses, combined with the simulated IRF based on the simple calibrated example (Figure
1), imply that the presence of the II speciﬁcation or the assumption of agents’ adaptive
behaviour improve the ﬁt of the model.
7 Further Model Validation
The summary statistics such as ﬁrst and second moments have been standard for researchers
to use to validate models in the literature on DSGE models, especially in the RBC tradition.
As the Bayes factors (or posterior model odds) are used to assess the relative ﬁt amongst a
number of competing models, the question of comparing the moments is whether the models
correctly predict population moments, such as the variables’ volatility or their correlation,
i.e. to assess the absolute ﬁt of a model to macroeconomic data. Following Schorfheide
(2000), let ˆ yT be a sample of observation of length T that one could have observed in the past
or that one might observe in the future. One can derive the sampling distribution of ˆ yT given
the current state of knowledge using the Bayes theorem: p(ˆ yT|yT) =
 
L(ˆ yT|θ)p(θ|yT)dθ.
Assume that T(yT) is a test quantity that reﬂects an aspect of the data (moment) that
one wants to check, e.g. correlation between output and inﬂation or the output volatility.
In order to assess whether the estimated model can replicate population moments, one
sequentially generates draws from the posterior distribution, p(θ|yT) and the predictive
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7.1 Standard Moment Criteria
To assess the contributions of assuming diﬀerent information sets and proportions of
adaptive agents in our estimated model variants, we compute some selected second mo-
ments and present the results in this subsection. Table 5 presents the second moments
implied by the above estimations and compares with those in the actual data. In partic-
ular, we compute these model implied statistics by simulating the models at the posterior
means obtained from estimation. The models are simulated by using 10000 series with
10000 periods. The ﬁrst 1000 observations are dropped to eliminate the possible eﬀect of
initial conditions and an HP ﬁlter is applied before computing the moments to eliminate
the possible trends. The results of model’s second moments are compared with the sec-
ond moments in the actual data to evaluate model’s empirical performance for the selected
model variants.
Standard Deviation
Model Output Inﬂation Interest rate
Data 4.99 0.62 0.74
Model GH AI 5.01 0.71 0.94
Model Z AI 3.01 0.81 1.06
Model GH II 4.57 0.67 0.88
Model Z II 2.67 0.50 0.80
Model COM H AI 2.77 0.51 0.66
Model COM H II 2.58 0.49 0.65
Cross-correlation with Output
Data 1.00 -0.22 -0.36
Model GH AI 1.00 -0.50 -0.71
Model Z AI 1.00 -0.51 -0.46
Model GH II 1.00 -0.47 -0.69
Model Z II 1.00 -0.16 -0.21
Model COM H AI 1.00 -0.19 -0.42
Model COM H II 1.00 -0.18 -0.41
Autocorrelations (Order=1)
Data 0.96 0.85 0.94
Model GH AI 0.98 0.88 0.95
Model Z AI 0.95 0.91 0.96
Model GH II 0.98 0.87 0.94
Model Z II 0.98 0.89 0.95
Model COM H AI 0.84 0.95 0.91
Model COM H II 0.84 0.94 0.91
Table 5: Selected Second Moments
In terms of the standard deviations, almost all the rational expectations models gener-
ate relative high volatility compared to the actual data (except for output). In line with
the Bayesian model comparison, Model GH (assuming II and rational expectations) ﬁts
24the data better in terms of implied volatility, getting closer to the data in this dimension.
Overall, the estimated models are able to reproduce acceptable volatility for the main vari-
ables of the DSGE model. The inﬂation volatilities implied by the models are close to
that of the data. All rational expectations models under investigation appear to match
well the autocorrelations (order=1) of all the endogenous variables. Using the behavioural
model, output is less autocorrelated while inﬂation seems to be more autocorrelated then
those in the data at order 1. Table 5 also reports the cross-correlations of the 3 observable
variables vis-a-vis output. The data report that the inﬂation rate and nominal interest
rate are countercyclical. All model variants perform successfully in generating the nega-
tive contemporaneous inﬂation-output and interest rate-output correlations observed in the
data.
The ‘preferred’ model, Model GH (assuming imperfect information and rational expec-
tations), does a better job at matching the data volatilities and ﬁrst order autocorrelations,
suggesting that habit formation and informational symmetry help ﬁtting the data in these
dimensions. In addition, the abilities of Model Z in capturing the inﬂation and interest
rate volatilities and the contemporaneous cross-correlations are improved quite signiﬁcantly
when assuming there is informational symmetry. Overall, Bayesian Maximum-likelihood
based methods suggest that all the implications of each model for ﬁtting the data are con-
tained in their likelihood functions. In other words, the simulation results mainly show
that, switching from AI and II delivers a better ﬁt to most features of the actual data, as
suggested by the data and likelihood criterion.
The behavioural models, in general, are able to capture the main features of the data
in most dimensions and strengthen the argument that the presence of partial rationality is
supported by the data. In particular, Model H assuming adaptive expectations performs
very well in generating and matching the contemporaneous cross-correlations of output
with both inﬂation and interest rate, outperforming all its rivals. Model H is also more
successful in replicating the interest rate volatility captured by the data. However, the
main shortcoming that the behavioural model faces is the diﬃculty of replicating the output
volatility.
7.2 Unconditional Autocorrelations
To further illustrate how the estimated models capture the data statistics based on diﬀerent
information or behavioural assumptions, we plot the unconditional autocorrelations of the
actual data and those of the endogenous variables generated by the model variants in Figure
3. In general, all rational expectations models match reasonably well the autocorrelations
shown in the data within a shorter period horizon and our ‘best’ rational expectations
model, Model GH under II, does a slightly better job at matching the autocorrelations
compared to its AI counterpart. The data report that all variables are positively and very
signiﬁcantly autocorrelated over short horizons. At a lag of one quarter, all the estimated
models are able to generate the observed autocorrelations as noted above (except for the
25output autocorrelograms simulated by the behavioural model H), but at higher lags, the
model simulated autocorrelations under AI are greater (more persistence) than those of the
sample for the interest rate and inﬂation for the rational expectations model, but display
less persistence for the behavioral model. When it comes to matching the interest rate a
similar story applies except that the persistence switch-over of the behavoural model does
not occur.
Of particular interest is that, when assuming II, the implied autocorrelograms produced
by Model Z ﬁt extremely well the observed autocorrelations of interest rate and inﬂation
while its AI counterpart generates much sluggishness and is less able to match the inﬂation
autocorrelation observed in the data from the second lag onwards. Imperfect information
can therefore do much to improve the empirical performance of the simplest NK model
Z with no added persistence mechanisms, though overall it loses out in comparison with
models with these features. The results in this exercise again generally show that the DSGE
models under II perform better at capturing the main features of the US data, strengthening
the argument that the presence of informational symmetry helps improve the model ﬁt to
data.
8 Conclusions
Our paper makes both a methodological and substantive contribution to the macroeconomic
literature on imperfect information. The methodological contribution is the provision of a
general tool for estimating DSGE models by Bayesian Maximum-likelihood methods un-
der very general information assumptions on the part of private agents. Our substantive
contribution is an application to a NK model where we compare the standard approach,
that assumes an informational asymmetry between private agents and the econometrician,
with as assumption of informational symmetry. For the former private agents observe all
state variables including shocks, whereas the econometrician only uses only data for output,
inﬂation and interest rates. For the latter both agents have the same imperfect informa-
tion set. For the rational model, we ﬁnd that in terms of model posterior probabilities,
impulse responses, second moments and autocorrelations, the assumption of informational
symmetry signiﬁcantly improves the model ﬁt to data.The behavioural model easily wins
the marginal likelihood race, but this must be qualiﬁed by the poor ﬁt of output volatility
and is failure to capture observed persistence in output and the interest rate.
There are three other notable results. First, we study variants of our model which close
down the two endogenous persistence mechanisms of habit in consumption and indexing in
turn. We then pose the question of whether imperfect information can provide an alternative
source of endogenous persistence as illustrated in our simple analytical model. Indeed we
ﬁnd this is the case: our Model Z with neither mechanism and with imperfect (symmetric)
information ﬁts the observed autocorrelation of the data of the interest rate and inﬂation
extremely well, whereas the same model with perfect (asymmetric) information on the part
26of the private sectors results in a poor ﬁt in this dimension. Second we study symmetric
information with measurement error for the observed macroeconomic series and ﬁnd this
improves the ﬁt still further, thought the increase in the model probability is not signiﬁcant.
Finally there is little to be gained from the indexation mechanism in terms of model ﬁt, an
encouraging result for our workhorse NK model as price-indexation is generally deemed to
be an unsatisfactory ad hoc compromise feature of this genre.
There are a number of directions for future research. We have deliberately chosen to
apply our methodology to a relatively simple NK model with only few frictions. Having
demonstrated that information plays an important role for the estimation of this model,
the next step would be to examine its implications for closed- and open-economy models
with a range of frictions such as Smets and Wouters (2007) and Adolfson et al. (2007),
respectively. Second as alluded to in the introduction there are other ways of modelling
information limitations associated with the rational inattention literature. We have shown
that our general framework with a single measurement error is equivalent to models in the
rational inattention literature that assumes a single predetermined variable and rely on
information channel capacity. However a formal comparison with the sticky information
approach of Mankiw and Reis (2002) would be of some interest. Finally optimal policy
needs to be examined making consistent information assumptions at the estimation and
policy analysis stages. If imperfect information on the part of the private sector proves (as
in our rational model) to be strongly supported empirically in a range of DSGE models with
various frictions, this suggests that the imperfect information solution of optimal policy set
out in Pearlman (1992) is appropriate.
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30Appendix
A Linearization of Behavioural Model
Log-linearizing the non-linear system as it stands gives
qr
t = ξβEr
t [πt+1 + qr








t+1] − ξβγπt + (1 − βξ)(mct + mst)
(A.2)
















t − (rt − λhE
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(1 − ̺)(1 − σ) − 1
1 − hC















yt = cyct + (1 − cy)gt (A.8)
ξ(πt − γπt−1) = (1 − ξ)(λfqr
t + (1 − λf)qa
t ) (A.9)
where we distinguish between adaptive expectations of inﬂation by households and ﬁrms, Ea
h,t[πt+1]
and Ea
f,t[πt+1] respectively.. However the following obviates the need to deﬁne separate adaptive
process for ﬁrms for both qa
t and πt. Deﬁne ¯ qa
t = qa
t +πt −γπt−1, ¯ qr
t = qr
t +πt −γπt−1. Then (A.1),








t+1 + πt − γπt−1 + (1 − βξ)(mct + mst) (A.11)
πt − γπt−1 = (1 − ξ)(λf ¯ qr
t + (1 − λf)¯ qa
t ) (A.12)
Equation (A.12) represents the central cognitive requirement for the adaptive ﬁrms, and is central
to deriving the remaining relationships of the model. We assume that these agents (1) observe the
overall inﬂation rate πt and since they choose their own optimal relative price qa
t at time t they
therefore observe ¯ qa
t = qa
t + πt − γπt−1, and (2) know the value of ξ as well as the proportion of
adaptive ﬁrms 1 − λf. Armed with this information they can deduce the value of ¯ qr
t from (A.12).
Similarly rational ﬁrms can deduce the value of ¯ qa
t .
We also need to deﬁne adaptive processes for Ea
h,t[πt+1], Eh,tua
c,t+1 and Ef,t¯ qa
t+1:
Ef,t¯ qa
t+1 =  1¯ qa
t + (1 −  1)Ef,t−1¯ qa
t
Eh,tua
c,t+1 =  2muC
t + (1 −  2)Eh,t−1ua
c,t
Eh,tπa
t+1 =  3πt + (1 −  3)Eh,t−1πa
t
Since adaptive and rational agents need to form their own (diﬀering) expectations of future
inﬂation we need to explain how expectations are formed of one another’s expectations of future ¯ qa
t
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t+1 is known to adaptive ﬁrms. Therefore taking expectations Ea
f,t of (A.13) and noting
that Ea
f,t¯ qr
t = ¯ qr







We now make the assumption that adaptive agents do not think they are able to have better
expectations of Ea
f,t¯ qr










t+1. Hence it follows that
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Rational agents are aware that they can form superior estimates to adaptive agents of ¯ qa
t+1.











But adaptive agents assume
Ea
f,t+1¯ qa
t+2 =  1¯ qa
t+1 + (1 −  1)Ea
f,t¯ qa
t+1 (A.17)
























which is the deﬁning equation for Er
t ¯ qa
t+1, which is substituted into
Er
t πt+1 − γπt−1 = (1 − ξ)(λfEr
t ¯ qr
t+1 + (1 − λf)Er
t ¯ qa
f,t+1)
found by taking RE of (A.15)
B Proof of Theorem
Assume a model of the form
Zt+1 = J(Zt,Xt) + ησεt+1 EtXt+1 = K(Zt,Xt)
where σ is small, and with measurements
Wt = L(Zt,Xt)
We shall assume that there is a solution to this which involves the innovations process variable
˜ Zt ≡ Zt − Et−1Zt:
Xt = g(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ) Zt+1 = h(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ) + ησεt+1 ˜ Zt+1 = f( ˜ Zt,σ) + ησεt+1
32Also assume that
EtZt − EtZt−1 = Et ˜ Zt = i( ˜ Zt)
Noting that K(Zt,Xt) = EtK(Zt,Xt) it follows that
K(Zt,g(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ)) = EtK(Zt,g(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ))
and the 1st order approximation to this is
K1zt + K2g1zt + K2g2˜ zt = K1(zt − ˜ zt + i1˜ zt) + K2g1(zt − ˜ zt + i1˜ zt) + K2g2i1˜ zt (B.18)
Ultimately we shall be solving for the partial derivative values at the steady state of f,g,h,i, and
in particular by equating terms in zt and ˜ zt in (B.18) we obtain
K1 + K2g1 = g1h1 K1 + K2g1 + K2g2 = (K1 + K2g1 + K2g2)i1
In the 1-dimensional case it is clear that i1 = 1, and if the dimension of Wt equals that of Zt then
i1 = I, the identity matrix. Now consider the second non-linear equation:
K(Zt,Xt) = K(Zt,g(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ)) = Etg(Zt+1, ˜ Zt+1,σ)
= Etg(h(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ) + ησεt+1,f( ˜ Zt,σ) + ησεt+1,σ)
The ﬁrst order approximation to this is
K1zt +K2g1zt +K2g2˜ zt +K2gσσ = g1h1(zt − ˜ zt+i1˜ zt)+g1h2i1˜ zt +g2f1i1˜ zt +g1hσσ+g2fσσ+gσσ
from which it follows that
K1 + K2g1 = g1h1 K2g2 = −g1h1 + g1h1i1 + g1h2i1 + g2f1i1 K2gσ = g1hσ + g2fσ + gσ
Equating the two Zt+1 equations implies
h(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ) = J(Zt,Xt) = J(Zt,g(Zt, ˜ zt,σ))
so that to ﬁrst order
J1zt + J2g1zt + J2g2˜ zt + J2gσσ = h1zt + h2˜ zt + hσσ
and hence
J1 + J2g1 = h1 J2g2 = h2 J2gσ = hσ
Note that K1 + K2g1 = g1h1 and J1 + J2g1 = h1 are the standard saddlepath solutions for g1 and
h1.
Finally we need an equation describing how Etzt is calculated. Thus assume that Et−1zt is
known. We can use the extended Kalman ﬁlter,14 but evaluated always around the steady state.
14The control theory literature provides numerous numerical studies of convergence of the extended
Kalman ﬁlter. There appears to be no guarantee of convergence, so that the problem might possibly
be exacerbated by the approximation chosen, but the vast majority of the studies show that the extended
Kalman ﬁlter is very reliable. There are very few studies that compare the extended Kalman ﬁlter to the
33The measurement is given by Wt = L(Zt,Xt) = L(Zt,g(Zt, ˜ Zt,σ)). It follows that




where H = L1 + L2g1 + L2g2. It follows that
i1 = PHT(HPHT)−1H
Having solved previously for g1,h1 we still have to solve for g2,h2,f1,i1 as well as for P. Note
that the latter arises from
P = f1PfT
1 + σ2ηηT
In addition we require that the ﬁrst-order approximation to ˜ Zt+1 equation derived from the the Zt+1
equation should have the same ﬁrst-order approximation as the ˜ Zt+1 equation itself. This implies
that
(h1 + h2)(I − i1) = f1 fσ = 0
This implies that we need to solve for the nx+nz unknowns gσ,hσ for which the remaining equations
reduce to :
(K2 − I)gσ = g1hσ J2gσ = hσ
Since K2 is nx ×nx and J2 is nz ×nx, it follows that there are nx +nz equations in (B) from which
it follows that gσ = 0,hσ = 0.
Thus the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe Theorem 1 applies to the case of partial information as well.
exact ﬁlter calculated numerically. However a more recent approach with considerably more accuracy is due
to Julier and Uhlmann (2004).
34C Priors and Posterior Estimates
Parameter Notation Prior distribution Identiﬁcation check♦
Density Mean S.D/df ML mode S.D. Bias⋆
Risk aversion σ Normal 2.00 0.50 2.17 0.39 0.17
Price indexation γ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.33 0.16 0.17
Calvo prices ξ Beta 0.50 0.10 0.53 0.06 0.02
Consumption habit formation hC Beta 0.50 0.20 0.47 0.04 0.03
Preference parameter ̺ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.09 0.00
Labour share α Normal 0.80 0.10 0.78 0.24 0.02
Adaptive expectations
Error adjustment - Ef,t¯ qa
t+1  1 Beta 0.50 0.20 0.62 0.19 0.12
Error adjustment - Eh,tua
c,t+1  2 Beta 0.50 0.20 0.54 0.04 0.04
Error adjustment - Ea
h,t[πt+1]  3 Beta 0.50 0.20 0.53 0.02 0.03
Proportion of rational households λh Beta 0.50 0.20 0.46 0.04 0.04
Proportion of rational ﬁrms λf Beta 0.50 0.20 0.46 0.08 0.04
Interest rate rule
Inﬂation θπ Normal 2.00 0.50 2.09 0.13 0.09
Output θy Normal 0.125 0.05 0.124 0.03 0.001
Interest rate smoothing ρr Beta 0.80 0.10 0.80 0.01 0.00
AR(1) coeﬃcient
Technology ρa Beta 0.85 0.10 0.82 0.02 0.03
Government spending ρg Beta 0.85 0.10 0.83 0.02 0.02
Price mark-up ρms Beta 0.50 0.20 0.37 0.16 0.13
Standard deviation of AR(1) innovations
Technology sd(ǫa) Inv. gamma 0.60 2.00 1.14z 0.18 0.14
Government spending sd(ǫg) Inv. gamma 1.67 2.00 0.97 0.04 0.03
Price mark-up sd(ǫms) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 1.06 0.34 0.06
Standard deviation of I.I.D. shocks/mearsument errors
Mark-up process sd(ǫm) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 0.63 0.37 0.37
Monetary policy sd(ǫe) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 1.02 0.02 0.02
Observation error (inﬂation) sd(ǫπ) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 - - -
Observation error (output) sd(ǫy) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00 - - -
Table 6: Prior Distributions and ML Estimation Based on Artiﬁcial Data
♦ We generated artiﬁcial data observations of length T=5000 by imposing the prior means to all
of the parameters (except for the S.D. of the shocks). The results presented here are based on
maximum likelihood estimates of Model GH (behavioural) for the T=5000 observations.
⋆ Note that Bias is measured as the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the prior mean and
the mean of ML estimates for each parameter.
z The artiﬁcial data are simulated assuming that the standard deviations of all the shocks are 1
instead of using their prior means.
35AI II IIME
Parameter Model GH Model H Model G Model Z Model GH Model H Model G Model Z Model GH Model H Model G Model Z
σ 2.28 [1.51:3.01] 2.22 [1.44:3.03] 2.57 [1.92:3.25] 2.62 [1.93:3.24] 2.36 [1.60:3.07] 2.30 [1.57:3.06] 2.66 [1.99:3.29] 2.78 [2.07:3.42] 2.38 [1.64:3.09] 2.30 [1.53:3.04] 2.62 [2.00:3.26] 2.74 [2.01:3.39]
γ 0.38 [0.16:0.58] - 0.34 [0.14:0.53] - 0.43 [0.21:0.65] - 0.39 [0.20:0.57] - 0.49 [0.24:0.73] - 0.47 [0.23:0.69] -
ξ 0.82 [0.75:0.90] 0.85 [0.79:0.91] 0.60 [0.46:0.76] 0.67 [0.55:0.79] 0.83 [0.76:0.90] 0.85 [0.79:0.91] 0.64 [0.56:0.72] 0.70 [0.62:0.82] 0.83 [0.76:0.91] 0.86 [0.80:0.91] 0.67 [0.60:0.75] 0.71 [0.63:0.80]
hC 0.84 [0.75:0.93] 0.86 [0.78:0.94] - - 0.80 [0.69:0.91] 0.84 [0.76:0.92] - - 0.81 [0.71:0.91] 0.84 [0.77:0.93] - -
̺ 0.33 [0.07:0.58] 0.33 [0.06:0.59] 0.37 [0.10:0.63] 0.32 [0.08:0.53] 0.35 [0.08:0.61] 0.33 [0.08:0.58] 0.37 [0.12:0.65] 0.25 [0.04:0.47] 0.34 [0.07:0.59] 0.33 [0.07:0.58] 0.31 [0.07:0.53] 0.31 [0.07:0.54]
α 0.87 [0.72:1.00] 0.87 [0.72:1.02] 0.75 [0.62:0.88] 0.76 [0.61:0.89] 0.87 [0.73:1.01] 0.88 [0.73:1.03] 0.74 [0.61:0.87] 0.74 [0.58:0.89]] 0.86 [0.72:1.01] 0.87 [0.73:1.02] 0.73 [0.60:0.86] 0.72 [0.58:0.86]
Interest rate rule
θπ 1.58 [1.18:1.96] 1.55 [1.08:1.95] 2.97 [2.43:3.52] 2.84 [2.40:3.34] 1.57 [1.19:1.95] 1.48 [1.08:1.86] 2.87 [2.39:3.38] 2.73 [1.34:3.55] 1.57 [1.17:1.96] 1.48 [1.07:1.84] 2.90 [2.33:3.43] 2.83 [2.28:3.56]
θy 0.09 [0.00:0.17] 0.08 [-0.01:0.17] 0.23 [0.16:0.29] 0.24 [0.18:0.30] 0.08 [0.00:0.17] 0.08 [-0.01:0.17] 0.22 [0.16:0.28] 0.19 [0.08:0.29] 0.08 [0.00:0.17] 0.08 [-0.01:0.16] 0.23 [0.17:0.30] 0.21 [0.15:0.30]
ρr 0.80 [0.75:0.86] 0.81 [0.75:0.97] 0.58 [0.44:0.71] 0.53 [0.44:0.64] 0.80 [0.75:0.86] 0.81 [0.76:0.87] 0.52 [0.40:0.65] 0.54 [0.35:0.75] 0.81 [0.75:0.87] 0.81 [0.76:0.86] 0.55 [0.43:0.69] 0.46 [0.29:0.62]
AR(1) coeﬃcient
ρa 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.98 [0.96:0.99] 0.96 [0.95:0.98] 0.96 [0.95:0.98] 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.97 [0.95:0.99] 0.97 [0.94:0.99] 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.96 [0.95:0.98] 0.97 [0.95:0.98]
ρg 0.92 [0.87:0.97] 0.93 [0.87:0.98] 0.88 [0.84:0.93] 0.89 [0.85:0.94] 0.92 [0.86:0.97] 0.93 [0.88:0.98] 0.87 [0.82:0.92] 0.88 [0.82:0.95]] 0.91 [0.86:0.97] 0.93 [0.88:0.98] 0.86 [0.82:0.91] 0.88 [0.83:0.93]
ρms 0.27 [0.04:0.47] 0.36 [0.05:0.65] 0.98 [0.96:0.99] 0.98 [0.96:0.99] 0.40 [0.10:0.69] 0.50 [0.19:0.80] 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.89 [0.53:0.99] 0.40 [0.11:0.69] 0.54 [0.19:0.83] 0.98 [0.97:0.99] 0.95 [0.96:0.99]
Standard deviation of AR(1) innovations
sd(ǫa) 1.39 [0.92:1.83] 1.62 [1.12:2.17]] 0.74 [0.58:0.89] 0.72 [0.57:0.86] 1.27 [0.85:1.70] 1.49 [1.02:2.00] 0.71 [0.57:0.84] 0.70 [0.53:0.88] 1.26 [0.87:1.65] 1.43 [0.94:1.98] 0.72 [0.59:0.86] 0.72 [0.57:0.88]
sd(ǫg) 2.03 [1.80:2.56] 2.03 [1.80:2.25] 2.60 [2.07:3.09] 2.69 [2.19:3.17] 2.05 [1.83:2.28] 2.03 [1.81:2.25] 2.62 [2.12:3.07] 2.62 [1.98:3.17]] 2.05 [1.81:2.27] 2.02 [1.80:2.24] 2.71 [2.21:3.14] 2.65 [2.11:3.21]
sd(ǫms) 0.07 [0.03:0.12] 0.07 [0.03:0.11] 0.23 [0.04:0.41] 0.17 [0.04:0.34] 0.07 [0.03:0.12] 0.06 [0.03:0.10] 0.11 [0.05:0.17] 0.14 [0.04:0.25] 0.06 [0.03:0.10] 0.06 [0.03:0.09] 0.09 [0.04:0.13] 0.11 [0.04:0.19]
Standard deviation of I.I.D. shocks/mearsument errors
sd(ǫm) 0.11 [0.04:0.17] 0.08 [0.03:0.13] 0.14 [0.05:0.20] 0.16 [0.09:0.24] 0.11 [0.04:0.16] 0.06 [0.03:0.10] 0.23 [0.18:0.27] 0.18 [0.03:0.26] 0.09 [0.03:0.14] 0.06 [0.03:0.09] 0.13 [0.03:0.23] 0.13 [0.03:0.24]
sd(ǫe) 0.27 [0.24:0.30] 0.27 [0.24:0.29] 0.26 [0.22:0.30] 0.22 [0.17:0.26] 0.27 [0.24:0.30] 0.27 [0.24:0.30] 0.29 [0.25:0.33] 0.27 [0.22:0.31]] 0.27 [0.24:0.30] 0.27 [0.24:0.30] 0.28 [0.24:0.32] 0.25 [0.21:0.30]
sd(ǫπ) - - - - - - - - 0.09 [0.03:0.14] 0.06 [0.03:0.09] 0.15 [0.03:0.25] 0.14 [0.03:0.25]
sd(ǫy) - - - - - - - - 0.07 [0.02:0.12] 0.07 [0.02:0.12] 0.06 [0.03:0.10] 0.07 [0.02:0.12]
Price contract length
1
1−ξ 5.56 6.67 2.50 3.03 5.88 6.67 2.78 3.33 5.88 7.14 3.03 3.45
LL and posterior model odd
LL -239.59 -238.20 -245.30 -244.37 -230.95 -230.89 -239.15 -242.04 -230.52 -231.37 -238.40 -239.21
Prob. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.15 0.00 0.00
Table 7: Bayesian Posterior Distributions♦
♦ Notes: we report posterior means and 90% probability intervals (in parentheses) based on the output of the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm.
Sample range: 1970:I to 2004:IV.
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6AI II IIME
Parameter Model GH Model H Model G Model Z Model GH Model H Model G Model Z Model GH Model H Model G Model Z
σ 2.48 [1.74:3.32] 2.46 [1.70:3.17] 2.60 [1.90:3.31] 2.53 [1.80:3.25] 2.52 [1.76:3.26] 2.50 [1.77:3.22] 2.55 [1.84:3.24] 2.50 [1.81:3.18] 2.52 [1.81:3.25] 2.55 [1.83:3.28] 2.55 [1.82:3.30] 2.50 [1.83:3.15]
γ 0.29 [0.11:0.46] - 0.27 [0.11:0.43] - 0.29 [0.11:0.47] - 0.24 [0.10:0.39] - 0.30 [0.12:0.47] - 0.24 [0.10:0.38] -
ξ 0.91 [0.87:0.95] 0.89 [0.84:0.94] 0.87 [0.82:0.92] 0.86 [0.81:0.92] 0.91 [0.87:0.95] 0.88 [0.83:0.95] 0.88 [0.83:0.92] 0.87 [0.81:0.92] 0.90 [0.85:0.95] 0.88 [0.81:0.94] 0.87 [0.83:0.92] 0.87 [0.82:0.92]
hC 0.87 [0.80:0.94] 0.88 [0.80:0.95] - - 0.88 [0.81:0.94] 0.87 [0.80:0.95] - - 0.87 [0.80:0.94] 0.87 [0.80:0.95] - -
̺ 0.46 [0.12:0.76] 0.45 [0.12:0.76] 0.20 [0.04:0.36] 0.22 [0.03:0.39] 0.46 [0.14:0.77] 0.44 [0.12:0.73] 0.20 [0.03:0.36] 0.21 [0.05:0.38] 0.46 [0.15:0.76] 0.43 [0.11:0.72] 0.21 [0.04:0.37] 0.21 [0.04:0.38]
α 0.79 [0.63:0.95] 0.80 [0.64:0.97] 0.90 [0.74: 1.05] 0.89 [0.74:1.05] 0.79 [0.63:0.95] 0.79 [0.63:0.94] 0.91 [0.75:1.06] 0.90 [0.73:1.05]] 0.78 [0.63:0.94] 0.79 [0.63:0.93] 0.90 [0.75:1.06] 0.89 [0.74:1.06]
Adaptive expectations
 1 0.30 [0.13:0.47] 0.29 [0.11:0.49] 0.25 [0.10:0.39] 0.29 [0.10:0.49] 0.29 [0.12:0.45] 0.32 [0.11:0.53] 0.28 [0.13:0.43] 0.30 [0.11:0.50] 0.28 [0.11:0.45] 0.30 [0.10:0.49] 0.29 [0.12:0.43] 0.32 [0.13:0.51]
 2 0.39 [0.18:0.59] 0.42 [0.20:0.62] 0.19 [0.01:0.36] 0.30 [0.07:0.51] 0.42 [0.19:0.68] 0.43 [0.21:0.65] 0.18 [0.01:0.36] 0.31 [0.07:0.52] 0.43 [0.18:0.70] 0.47 [0.21:0.76] 0.22 [0.02:0.42] 0.26 [0.06:0.43]
 3 0.47 [0.04:0.78] 0.46 [0.04:0.78] 0.23 [0.02:0.57] 0.12 [0.01:0.31] 0.49 [0.13:0.85] 0.45 [0.04:0.77] 0.23 [0.01:0.57] 0.16 [0.01:0.44] 0.48 [0.04:0.78] 0.46 [0.04:0.77] 0.18 [0.01:0.51] 0.18 [0.08:0.48]
λh 0.73 [0.56:0.89] 0.69 [0.51:0.87] 0.20 [0.03:0.36] 0.16 [0.02:0.29] 0.75 [0.60:0.93] 0.71 [0.54:0.96] 0.18 [0.02:0.34] 0.15 [0.02:0.30] 0.76 [0.60:0.93] 0.72 [0.54:0.93] 0.17 [0.02:0.33] 0.16 [0.01:0.29]
λf 0.17 [0.01:0.33] 0.18 [0.02:0.32] 0.14 [0.02:0.27] 0.16 [0.02:0.29] 0.18 [0.02:0.34] 0.23 [0.02:0.43] 0.16 [0.02:0.30] 0.18 [0.02:0.32] 0.20 [0.02:0.38] 0.24 [0.03:0.46] 0.15 [0.02:0.29] 0.18 [0.02:0.33]
Interest rate rule
θπ 1.92 [1.45:2.40] 1.89 [1.42:2.32] 1.71 [1.28:2.12] 1.69 [1.20:2.15] 1.95[1.46:2.42] 1.91 [1.43:2.40] 1.69 [1.26:2.09] 1.69 [1.20:2.09] 1.93 [1.46:2.37] 1.90 [1.43:2.37] 1.71 [1.28:2.13] 1.63 [1.16:2.06]
θy 0.11 [0.04:0.18] 0.11 [0.04:0.18] 0.14 [0.07:0.20] 0.13 [0.07:0.20] 0.11 [0.03:0.17] 0.11 [0.03:0.17] 0.14 [0.07:0.20] 0.14 [0.08:0.20] 0.10 [0.04:0.17] 0.10 [0.03:0.17] 0.14 [0.07:0.20] 0.14 [0.07:0.20]
ρr 0.89 [0.85:0.93] 0.88 [0.84:0.92] 0.89 [0.85:0.92] 0.88 [0.85:0.92] 0.89 [0.85:0.93] 0.88 [0.84:0.92] 0.89 [0.85:0.92] 0.88 [0.85:0.92] 0.88 [0.84:0.92] 0.88 [0.83:0.92] 0.89 [0.85:0.93] 0.88 [0.84:0.92]
AR(1) coeﬃcient
ρa 0.87 [0.73:0.99] 0.86 [0.70:0.99] 0.84 [0.70:0.99] 0.84 [0.70:0.98] 0.90 [0.76:0.99] 0.90 [0.7:0.99] 0.84 [0.70:0.98] 0.85 [0.72:0.97] 0.91 [0.79:0.99] 0.91 [0.78:0.99] 0.85 [0.91:0.99] 0.87 [0.76:0.98]
ρg 0.93 [0.89:0.98] 0.93 [0.88:0.98] 0.96 [0.94:0.99] 0.96 [0.94:0.99] 0.93 [0.88:0.98] 0.93 [0.88:0.98] 0.96 [0.94:0.99] 0.96 [0.94:0.99]] 0.93 [0.88:0.98] 0.93 [0.88:0.98] 0.96 [0.94:0.99] 0.96 [0.94:0.99]
ρms 0.56 [0.19:0.91] 0.66 [0.40:0.93] 0.45 [0.12:0.77] 0.53 [0.26:0.81] 0.56 [0.20:0.90] 0.58 [0.24:0.91] 0.44 [0.13:0.76] 0.53 [0.26:0.81] 0.52 [0.15:0.89] 0.59 [0.24:0.93] 0.44 [0.14:0.76] 0.53 [0.26:0.81]
Standard deviation of AR(1) innovations
sd(ǫa) 0.94 [0.14:2.34] 0.71 [1.14:1.63]] 0.49 [0.15:0.83] 0.63 [0.13:1.30] 0.90 [0.16:1.89] 1.26 [1.14:2.53] 0.44 [0.15:0.75] 0.56 [0.15:1.15] 1.01 [0.16:1.88] 1.05 [0.18:1.84] 0.45 [0.15:0.77] 0.51 [0.16:0.89]
sd(ǫg) 2.07 [1.84:2.31] 2.06 [1.83:2.28] 2.17 [1.91:3.42] 2.14 [1.86:2.42] 2.06 [1.84:2.29] 2.05 [1.82:2.28] 2.18 [1.91:2.45] 2.16 [1.89:2.43]] 2.07 [1.84:2.28] 2.05 [1.83:2.28] 2.17 [1.89:2.45] 2.15 [1.88:2.41]
sd(ǫms) 0.08 [0.03:0.14] 0.15 [0.06:0.22] 0.08 [0.03:0.16] 0.14 [0.05:0.21] 0.08 [0.03:0.15] 0.12 [0.03:0.20] 0.08 [0.03:0.14] 0.13 [0.05:0.21] 0.08 [0.03:0.14] 0.13 [0.04:0.20] 0.08 [0.03:0.15] 0.13 [0.05:0.19]
Standard deviation of I.I.D. shocks/mearsument errors
sd(ǫm) 0.12 [0.07:0.17] 0.09 [0.03:0.14] 0.12 [0.06:0.17] 0.09 [0.03:0.15] 0.12 [0.06:0.17] 0.08 [0.03:0.13] 0.12 [0.06:0.17] 0.09 [0.03:0.14] 0.12 [0.07:0.17] 0.08 [0.0:0.14] 0.12 [0.05:0.17] 0.09 [0.03:0.14]
sd(ǫe) 0.26 [0.23:0.29] 0.26 [0.23:0.29] 0.26 [0.23:0.28] 0.26 [0.23:0.28] 0.26 [0.23:0.28] 0.26 [0.23:0.29] 0.25 [0.23:0.28] 0.25 [0.23:0.28]] 0.26 [0.23:0.29] 0.26 [0.23:0.29] 0.25 [0.23:0.28] 0.25 [0.23:0.28]
sd(ǫy) - - - - - - - - 0.001 [0.000:0.002] 0.001 [0.000:0.001] 0.001 [0.000:0.001] 0.001 [0.000:0.001]
Price contract length
1
1−ξ 11.11 9.09 7.69 7.14 11.11 8.33 8.33 7.69 10.00 8.33 7.69 7.69
LL and posterior model odd
LL -230.87 -227.14 -242.87 -239.28 -230.79 -226.55 -242.98 -238.55 -230.72 -227.27 -243.15 -239.12
Prob. 0.006 0.266 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.2335 0.000 0.000
Table 8: Bayesian Posterior Distributions (The Behavioural Model)♦
♦ Notes: we report posterior means and 90% probability intervals (in parentheses) based on the output of the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm.
Sample range: 1970:I to 2004:IV.
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Figure 2: Estimated Impulse Response Functions - AI vs. II♦
♦ Each panel plots the mean response corresponding a positive one standard deviation shock.
Each response is for a 10 period horizon. All DSGE impulse responses are computed simulating
the vector of DSGE model parameters at the posterior mean values reported in Table 5. The
impulse responses for VAR(4) are obtained using the DSGE-VAR identiﬁcation procedure
described in the section 5.4. Mark-up(ms) and Mark-up(m) represent the price mark-up shocks
(persistent and transient components respectively). The area in-between the black dashed lines
covers the space between the ﬁrst and ninth posterior deciles of the IRFs estimated by the VAR.
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